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Zusammenfassung 
Dieses Papier untersucht Veränderungen in der Beschäftigungs- und Sozialpolitik der 
Europäischen Union nach der Vertiefung der wirtschaftspolitischen Zusammenarbeit in 
Europa. Dabei wird die These vertreten, dass die Veränderungen in der 
wirtschaftspolitischen Zusammenarbeit zu einer Zunahme verbindlicher Element in den 
weichen Koordinierungszyklen der Beschäftigungs- und Sozialpolitik geführt haben. Das 
Papier zeichnet zwei Wege des ‚Aushärtens‘ der Beschäftigungs- und Sozialpolitik nach. 
Erstens wurden neue Instrumente in die Koordinierungszyklen von Europa 2020 
(Wachstumsstrategie für das kommende Jahrzehnt) und in den Stabilitäts- und 
Währungspakt eingebaut und über den Euro-Plus-Pakt und die Überwachung 
makroökonomischer Ungleichgewichte implementiert. Zweitens schafft die Integration 
der beiden Politikfelder Wirtschaft und Soziales Unsicherheit, welcher 
Koordinierungsmethode eine konkrete Politik zuzuordnen ist. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund werden in dem Papier zunächst die seit 2010 eingeführten 
Koordinierungselemente analysiert und auf einem Kontinuum verortet, das von 
verbindlicher zu weicher Koordinierung reicht. Dann wird herausgearbeitet, wo 
Unsicherheit über die Angemessenheit der einen oder anderen Koordinierungsmethode 
besteht und wie eben diese Unsicherheiten zu einer Unterordnung der Sozial- und 
Beschäftigungspolitik unter die verbindlichen Überwachungsinstrumente führt. 
Schließlich wird die Interaktion zwischen EU und vier Mitgliedstaaten (Deutschland, 
Großbritannien, Polen & Spanien) anhand von Länderberichten und Antworten der EU-
Ebene in 2009 und 2011 untersucht. Ungeachtet der Tatsache, dass unter dem Einfluss der 
vertieften wirtschaftspolitischen Zusammenarbeit die Präzision der weichen 
Steuerungsinstrumente und hybriden Koordinierungsmethoden zugenommen haben und 
Unsicherheit über die angemessene Koordinierungsmethode potentiell zu einer 
Beurteilung der Beschäftigungs- und Sozialpolitik im Rahmen der verbindlichen 
Wirtschaftskoordinierung führt, zeigt sich hier, dass Mitgliedstaaten immer noch großen 





1. Introduction   
This paper sets out to explore the changes in the EU’s coordination of employment and 
social policies after the introduction of stricter economic governance. It hypothesises that 
new economic governance has introduced characteristics of hard law into the soft law 
coordination cycles of employment and social policies. The paper analyses such steps 
towards hard law by exploring two routes. The first route is the introduction of new 
instruments in the coordination cycles of Europe 2020 and the Stability and Growth Pact 
and the implementation of two new coordination cycles, these being the Euro Plus Pact 
and the Macro-economic Imbalances Surveillance. The second route stems from the 
integration of policy fields which leads to ambiguity concerning what policy items fall 
within the scope of which coordination method. The paper therefore analyses the 
coordination elements that have been introduced as of 2010 and assesses their place on 
the continuum of hard and soft law coordination. Then, the paper explains the 
ambiguities that arise concerning the appropriateness of coordination instruments and 
how this ambiguity may bring employment and social policy elements within the range 
of hard law surveillance. Subsequently, the paper analyses the actual interaction between 
the EU and four member states by comparing national reports of 2009 and 2011 as well as 
the EU’s assessment of national policies. The paper concludes that whereas stricter 
economic coordination has increased the precision of soft governance as well as 
introduced more obligation and delegation into hybrid coordination methods, countries 
still have ample leeway to respond to EU level targets. In addition, ambiguity still exists 
concerning which coordination method applies to what policy items, leaving employment 
and social policies as potential subjects for hard law assessment via economic and 
financial coordination processes. 
 
2. Routes towards hard law: new instruments and the integration of policy fields 
Traditionally, the EU’s employment and social policies are executed via non-binding soft 
law governance, usually referred to as the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) (Trubek 
and Trubek, 2005; Zeitlin et al., 2005). The OMC sets common EU goals, yet allows member 
states to develop their own policies to meet these targets. Sanctions are not part of the 
set of tools and the effectiveness of soft law is rather explained by mechanisms such as 
naming & shaming, diffusion through discourse, deliberation between actors, learning, 
sharing best practices and networking (Trubek and Trubek, 2005). The policy goals are 
moreover quite flexible and may be quickly adapted to altered circumstances. The OMC 
furthermore aims at including a wide range of actors in policy-formation. Conversely, the 
legislative route involves a smaller set of actors, often being the European Commission, 
the European Council and the European Parliament. It exists of legally binding obligations 
that are rather precisely formulated and moreover entails the transference of authority 
for interpreting and implementing law (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). Sanctions are part of the 
set of instruments to trigger compliance with law. 
 
Although the terms ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ suggest a stark contrast, the OMC should not 
necessarily be viewed as the opposite of hard law (Smismans, 2011; Trubek and Trubek, 
2007; Trubek et al., 2005). To match the variety of different combinations of coordination 
methods, research should explore the interconnections between soft and hard law as well 




2011). Trubek et al., (2005) define hybrid constellations as coordination cycles that contain 
both hard and soft law elements. An example of a hybrid constellation is the fiscal 
coordination cycle that combines non-binding Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BPEGs) 
with a fixed set of rules belonging to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
 
Analysing hybrid coordination methods may be done by placing different forms and 
combinations of hard and soft law on a continuum or scale (Abbott and Snidal, 2000; 
Abbott et al., 2000). Such a scale could rank the coordination methods as well as its 
elements, and make an assessment of the degree of obligation, precision and delegation. 
Abbott and Snidal (2000: 422) talk about soft law as soon as at least one of these hard law 
elements is weakened. Obligation is defined as the degree to which states (or other actors) 
are legally bound by a rule or a commitment, meaning that their behaviour may be 
scrutinised under the general rules, procedure, and discourse of (international) law 
(Abbott at al., 2000). The degree of obligation ranges from a binding rule at the hard law 
end constituting an unconditional commitment, to an expressly non-legal norm on the 
soft law end with explicit negation of the intent to be legally binding. Precision is defined 
as the extent to which rules are defined in a clear and unambiguous way for instance 
concerning how these rules should be carried out and what is authorized. More precise 
rules thus narrow the scope for interpretation. Delegation is then the extent to which 
authority is granted to third parties to implement, interpret and apply rules as well as to 
resolve disputes and design subsequent rules (Abbott at al., 2000). A single coordination 
method might differ on each of the three elements in its degree of being ‘hard’ or ‘soft’. 
Using these degrees of hard and soft law assists this paper in making a first analysis of 
the type of measures that stricter economic governance has introduced in terms of these 
being quite soft or rather leaning towards hard law characteristics. Scholars judge that 
stricter economic governance has introduced quite fundamental changes or at least 
changes that have the potential of leading to fundamentally new governance structures 
and may thus impact member states to some extent (Amtenbrink, 2012; Pochet, 2010). 
However, a broad scrutiny of these new measures and their impact has yet to take place. 
 
The second route via which steps may be taken towards hard law in social policy domains 
is the integration of policy fields. Trubek et al. (2005) do not distinguish this option as a 
separate route, but look at options for interaction between coordination methods, for 
instance in areas where the employment strategy overlaps with EU law. Following Zeitlin 
(2010), this paper however argues that this second route is valuable to explore as a 
separate entity, as the integration of policy fields causes ambiguity as to which 
coordination method or instrument applies to what policy issue. This ambiguity may be a 
rather unintentional side-effect resulting from developing a vision on the same policy 
item by actors stemming from different policy domains. Thus, whereas the introduction 
of new coordination elements may be an intentional step on the continuum towards hard 
law, the integration of policy fields is a rather indirect way of bringing certain policy 
items within the scope of hard law coordination. Europe 2020 for instance integrates the 
economic, social and employment policy fields, whereas these policy areas fall Treaty-
wise within the scope of different coordination methods granting different competences 
to the EU. A policy item such as pensions may for instance be seen as an important object 
for realising cuts in public spending, whereas it has also an important social dimension 




monitor mutual interactions between policies, for instance the social dimension of 
economic targets (Zeitlin, 2010). Dinan (2012) describes the confusion that stems from the 
recent EU level initiatives by observing that the EU uses the term ‘economic governance’ 
to refer to very different policy cycles ranging from fiscal federalism to less binding 
coordination of socio-economic policies. If this confusion also includes the type of 
coordination instruments to use for executing this ‘economic governance’, then the EU 
could potentially be entering domains of national sovereignty via the backdoor of 
economic governance (Bekker and Palinkas, 2012). From a social policy perspective such 
coordination ambiguity might be especially problematic when coordination cycles and its 
goals are rivals (view Trubek and Trubek, 2007). If separate governance cycles operate 
within the same policy domain, yet have opposing goals, a choice might have to be made 
between existing coordination systems. Such a choice may simultaneously be one 
between binding and non-binding policy suggestions. This paper further explores in what 
way policies are integrated under the new economic governance package by exploring 
how the same policy areas are included in different coordination cycles and whether this 
means that employment and social policy items are evaluated in more binding policy 
cycles. 
 
3. Methodology  
To make a first exploration of new interconnections between hard and soft law this paper 
analyses a broad range of coordination methods, which encompasses more than just 
employment policies. To really asses the potential impact of the new EU-level 
coordination package, the Europe 2020 Strategy is explored as well as the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), the surveillance of Macro-economic imbalances, and the Euro Plus Pact. 
The analysis is based on relevant EU level documents. It explores the place of the new 
coordination elements on the continuum of soft and hard law coordination, firstly by 
establishing changes in obligation, precision and delegation, for instance determining 
changes in the leeway member states have to choose which goals to meet, how to meet 
them and at what pace. Next, the paper analyses the actual interactions between the EU 
and four member states in 2009 and 2011. This sheds light on the differences between 
the coordination method of the EU and the four member states before and after the 
introduction of the stricter economic governance package as of 2010. The four countries 
under scrutiny are Germany, Spain, Poland, and the UK. These have been selected based 
on their difference on two relevant characteristics. A first characteristic is either or not 
belonging to the Eurozone, as Eurozone countries face different rules than non-Eurozone 
countries especially in financial and budgetary policy areas. Poland and the UK do not 
belong to the Eurozone and may therefore experience fewer incentives to keep to stricter 
EU targets, while Germany and Spain may feel more peer pressure to comply with EU 
goals. A second characteristic is the economic situation, ranging from having an economy 
which has not suffered that much from the crisis (PL) to having severe troubles (ES). Some 
of the coordination techniques are only used when the situation in a country should be 
improved urgently and considerably, which could enhance both the pressure on a country 
to meet EU criteria and increase the level of scrutiny and guidance by the EU. This part of 
the analysis is based on EU documents released as part of the policy cycles of 2009 and 
2011 as well as the National Reform Programmes (NRPs) 2009 and 2011 which have been 
written by the respective national governments. All these documents are publicly 





As the NRPs are written by national governments these documents are part of the 
political process in dealing with EU level demands. Therefore, these NRPs should be 
viewed as political documents rather than neutrally formulated documents. This is also 
valid for EU-level documents as these contain political preferences and not only policy 
analyses (Barbier, 2005). It is important to be aware of such biases, while recognising that 
the documents written for and within the different policy cycles contain relevant 
information to assess the changing relations between the EU and its member states. 
Conclusions are therefore drawn with care. 
 
4. New coordination cycles and instruments through stricter economic governance 
The shock effect of the crisis triggered reflections at EU level on how to coordinate the 
policies of member states more strictly. The EU not only added new coordination 
elements to the Europe 2020 Strategy. It also introduced a stricter economic governance 
package consisting of new soft law tools as well as hard regulations such as the Six-Pack 
legislation (Council, 2011a) (see table 1 for an overview). 
4.1 Adjusting existing coordination cycles 
A first coordination cycle explored in this paper is the Europe 2020 Strategy which 
ultimately aims at smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Its policy cycle has roughly 
stayed the same and may still be characterised as a soft law policy cycle. However, new 
coordination elements have been introduced. Thus, the EU still communicates its policy 
guidelines to the member states on an annual basis, to which the member states respond 
by handing in their NRPs consisting of national policies that should contribute to 
reaching the European goals. The EU then evaluates these NRPs and gives country-specific 
recommendations (CSRs) to each individual member state. Yet, Europe 2020 introduced a 
wider set of quantitative targets encompassing employment, education & innovation, 
social policy and environmental targets, thus further interconnecting policy fields. 
Moreover it introduced the option for member states to define their own quantitative 
targets, also if these are below EU ambitions. Thus, on this latter aspect member states 
have gotten more leeway to respond to EU level goals (see also table 2). The new 
coordination elements also require more precision in policy responses, as member states 
have to give deadlines for policy conversion in their NRPs as well as spell out detailed 
policy steps that lead to the ultimate goals. In spite of this precision, member states may 
still formulate their own policy steps and set their own deadlines. The Commission 
however does expect that the policy steps are embedded in national budgets and laws. 
Another novelty is that the EU attaches deadlines to the CSRs, demanding national policy 
changes within 12 to 18 months (European Commission, 2011). Although these deadlines 
still fall within the sphere of soft law, it does increase the precision of coordination, as it 
indicates when a country should have taken action. Another observation is that, in spite 
of attempts to simplify coordination by decreasing the number of economic and 
employment guidelines, the overall sets of targets has expanded. Apart from the Europe 
2020 goals, the Commission introduced thematic flagship initiatives, as well as spelled out 
short-term targets in the Annual Growth Surveys and midterm targets in the 
Employment Package. 
A second coordination cycle under scrutiny of this paper is the SGP. This coordination 




arm contains soft law reporting in annual stability or convergence programmes (SCP) 
while its corrective arm, called the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), combines a rather 
soft early warning mechanism with hard fines for Eurozone countries that keep failing to 
meet the criteria of having a maximum deficit of 3% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and a debt ratio of maximally 60% of GDP. An early warning system should prevent the 
occurrence of an excessive deficit. However, if such a warning does not lead to better 
performance, the Commission will draft more specific recommendations to a member 
state, requesting corrective actions. Although the option to take corrective measures 
already existed prior to the implementation of stricter economic governance, the actual 
use of fines has never been decided upon, even though the situation in some countries 
could have justified such interventions (Morris et al., 2006). In 2005, after objections of 
member states to the upcoming fines, the SGP was changed to give member states more 
flexibility to develop policies to meet their individual economic circumstances for 
instance by pursuing a strategy of public investments. As of that year, member states 
have to set their own medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs) which are essentially 
country-specific intermediate steps towards the end goal (European Commission, 2007). In 
2011, when some (Eurozone) countries faced severe budgetary problems, stricter 
economic governance introduced new elements into the SGP via the Six-Pack legislation. 
Fiscal rules are now applied more strictly by defining quantitatively what a ‘significant 
deviation’ from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it means, and for Eurozone 
countries this is combined with an interest-bearing deposit of 0.2% of GDP in case of non-
compliance, also within this preventive arm. This is a step on the continuum towards 
obligation of countries to comply with their own budgetary objectives. Moreover, not 
meeting the debt criterion is from now on also a reason to launch the EDP (EP and 
Council, 2011a; European Commission, 2012a). The pace at which to lower debt may be 
pre-defined, which brings more precision into coordination. In addition, to facilitate the 
operation of the corrective arm, a new voting procedure has been installed, which aims at 
lowering the role of political processes that could block a Council conclusion. This new 
procedure is based on the reverse majority rule, meaning that the Commission's proposal 
for imposing sanctions will be considered adopted unless the Council votes against it by 
qualified majority. In essence this means some transference of power from the national 
to the EU level. The set of sanctions for euro-area countries ranges from a non-interest-
bearing deposit amounting to 0.2% of GDP to the conversion of this deposit into a fine of 
0.2% of GDP if the deficit is not corrected. Further non-compliance will result in the 
sanction being stepped up to 0.5% of GDP, which thus increases the degree of obligation. 
Concluding, more soft as well as hard law elements have been introduced in the SGP, thus 
further developing its hybrid coordination constellation, but also taking steps on the 
continuum towards more precision, obligation and delegation.  
4.2 Introducing new coordination cycles 
Apart from strengthening existing coordination methods, two new coordination cycles 
have been introduced after 2010: the Euro Plus Pact and the Macro-economic imbalances 
procedure. The Euro Plus Pact is a soft law coordination cycle. Countries can voluntary 
sign up to the Pact and report on their progress in their NRPs (European Council, 2011). 23 
Countries, including six countries outside the Eurozone, have signed up to the Pact. The 
Pact encourages member states to translate fiscal rules as laid down in the SGP into 




competitiveness, increase employment, contribute to the sustainability of public finances 
and reinforce financial stability. This Euro Plus Pact requires member states to announce 
a set of concrete actions to be achieved within twelve months, on the basis of indicators 
and principles (European Council, 2011). This means that there is quite some precision in 
the new soft law policy cycle. 
 
The Macro-economic imbalances surveillance assists in the new Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure (MIP) (EP and Council, 2011a and 2011b). It has a preventative and a 
corrective arm containing soft and hard law elements and thus forms a hybrid 
coordination method which has been consciously developed. The corrective arm is 
enforced via the Excessive Imbalances Procedure (EIP). A new scoreboard of indicators 
evaluates country performance, benchmarks and triggers learning effects between 
countries, acts as an alert system to timely assess macro-economic and competitive 
imbalances and serves as a basis to issue warnings to member states. This scoreboard 
thus combines soft governance techniques such as benchmarking with techniques that 
are a bit closer towards the hard law end of the continuum, such as warnings. Moreover, 
the scoreboard may be a first step on a path that could lead to more precise evaluations 
combined with gradually increasing obligations and delegation. A scoreboard alert leads 
to an in-depth study which considers whether potential imbalances are harmless or 
problematic. This evaluation goes beyond the scoreboard indicators, including a greater 
variety of information, thus potentially being more sensitive to specific national 
challenges. If excessive imbalances are revealed, the Council may adopt a 
recommendation for the country to take corrective action, entailing a set of policy 
directions as well as a deadline for handing in a corrective plan of action. By entering this 
stage, the member state is in the EIP. In its plan of action the member state has to write 
down a clear roadmap and a timetable for the implementation of policies that should 
correct for the imbalances (EP and Council, 2011b). Should the Council approve of the 
corrective action plan, it shall list recommendations of more specific actions and 
deadlines as well as a timetable for surveillance. The progress of a country is then closely 
monitored and the Council may adopt a decision establishing non-compliance in 
combination with recommendations and new deadlines for corrective actions. For 
Eurozone countries the EIP is accompanied with an enforcement mechanism consisting of 
an interest-bearing deposit which can be converted into a fine (up to 0.1% of GDP). The 
soft law benchmark between countries may thus gradually develop into more precisely 
prescribed policy measures including deadlines. Moreover, for Eurozone countries the 
option of getting fines forms a step towards obligation, whereas the supranational 
decision on the existence of a macro-economic imbalance forms a step on the continuum 
towards the delegation of power. 
Table 1: Overview of EU´s coordination methods of economic policies and its most relevant 
elements as of 2010 (Newly introduced elements in Bold + Italic) 
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EU target Reporting by
member state 
 Evaluation instruments or 






 - Quantitative targets 
- Policy guidelines 




Annual Growth Survey) 
- National Reform
Programme. Should 
now include time 
schedule with 
detailed policy steps 
 - Country Specific 
Recommendations should 
now include deadlines (in 
general 12 to 18 months at 
times combined with specific 






- a.o. a maximum of 3%




















- Recommendations with 
deadline1 
- Warnings via EDP 
 Deposits and fines (for 
Eurozone countries) 
 Predefined pace reduction 
expenditure 
 Decision sanction via 
reversed majority ruling 














actions set by 
member state 












 - Country report
after macro-
economic 







- More precise 
recommendation; 
- Warnings via Macro-
economic Imbalances 
Procedure 
- Fines (for Eurozone 
countries)  
 
Table 1 summarises the different coordination cycles in the broad area of economic 
governance. It shows the most important differences between the former coordination 
techniques by adding in bold and italic newly introduced elements. The table shows that 
whereas coordination cycles that directly deal with employment and social policies have 
become more precise, these still fall within the range of soft law governance as the level 
of obligation and delegation have fairly stayed the same. Conversely, coordination cycles 
that predominantly deal with economic and financial affairs, have hybrid coordination 
constructions in which more hard law elements have been introduced, thus taking steps 
towards more precision, delegation and obligation. The next section however argues that 
this does not necessarily mean that employment and social policies are totally excluded 
from coordination constituting more obligation and delegation. 
                                                 





5. Stricter Economic governance and integration of policies fields 
The integration of policy fields opens up another route for the introduction of hard law 
elements in the coordination of employment and social policies. It interconnects the 
different policy cycles by highlighting the same kind of policy items, yet from a different 
policy perspective. For instance, the introduction of the European Semester not only 
integrates policy fields by expecting member states to write the national reports for the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the Europe 2020 Strategy in joint cooperation. It also links 
separate coordination methods by introducing a joint evaluation of financial, economic, 
employment and social policies into one set of CSRs (European Commission, 2011). 
Although the signs of mixing coordination methods and policy domains in such a far-
reaching manner may be rather recent and still too vague, this section shows that EU 
documents contain interest in steering employment and social policies in a more forceful 
manner while also discussing the distinct dilemmas this brings along, especially 
regarding the autonomy of member states and national social partners. The ambiguity 
concerning which coordination method applies to what policy items has thus not been 
reduced by the economic governance initiatives. 
The dilemma is largest when employment and social policy items are evaluated from an 
economic or financial perspective. One example may be found in the Commission’s 
Employment Package, which deals with structural changes in labour markets. It gives 
both the reason of interest in social and employment issues from an economic 
perspective as well as phrases the distinct dilemmas concerning sovereignty. It first of all 
argues that “Better EU employment governance and coordination has become essential for at 
least two reasons. First, labour market participation, unemployment and labour cost play a role 
in macroeconomic stability, and are taken into consideration in the new regulation on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances….” (European Commission, 2012b: 
20). Here, the Commission refers among others to labour costs as an aspect that 
determines macroeconomic stability, and that these labour costs may be assessed via the 
hybrid coordination cycle of the Macro-economic imbalances surveillance. It thus brings 
labour costs within the range of the binding tools of the EIP. Yet, part of labour costs, such 
as the negotiation on wage growth, usually belongs to the autonomy of the national social 
partners. The Employment Package continues “… Second, the crisis has further revealed the 
interdependence of EU economies and labour markets, underscoring the need to accompany 
the new economic governance with strengthened coordination of employment and social 
policies in line with the European Employment Strategy provided for by the Treaty.” (European 
Commission, 2012b: 20). The Commission thus implies that the coordination of 
employment and social policies should be strengthened, but also seems to suggest that 
this should not be done via the new economic governance package, but rather should be 
based on the Treaty provisions allowing a soft coordination role of the EU in employment 
and social policy issues. In the same text the Commission underlines the autonomy of 
member states and the social partners, for instance reassuring that it takes account of 
national sovereignty in the coordination cycle to establish macro-economic imbalances. 
This however seems to be in contradiction with the prior statement on labour costs and 
therefore contributes to ambiguity on the applicability of coordination methods. The 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) also shows the integration of policy fields and 




partners. It therefore explicitly refers to Treaty Article 152 TFEU on respecting national 
practices and institutions for wage formation. Moreover, the MIP will take into account 
Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and thus not affect the right to 
negotiate, conclude collective agreements or to take collective action (EP and Council, 
2011b). Yet, the scoreboard of indicators used to assess the situation of countries, includes 
the three years percentage change in nominal unit labour cost (with thresholds of +9% for 
euro-area countries and +12% for non-euro-area countries) as well as the 3-year 
backward moving average of unemployment rate, with a threshold of 10% (European 
Commission, 2012c). This has led to other EU level actors, such as trade union ETUC, to 
fear that “Given the fact that macro economic imbalances are interconnected with a wide 
range of policies, this new process is giving finance ministers and DG ECFIN yet another 
possibility to intervene in areas where they have no competence (including collective 
bargaining, labour market institutions, public services,...” (ETUC, 2010: 1). 
The introduction of new coordination cycles and coordination elements as well as the 
coordination ambiguities stemming from the integration of policy fields are 
predominantly exercises on paper. It does not say much about the actual changes in the 
interaction between the EU and its member states. Therefore, the next sections compare 
the employment policy coordination cycles of 2009 and 2011, in search for differences. 
6. The pursuit of EU level goals before and after stricter economic governance 
It is first of all important to determine which policy cycles applied to the four case 
countries in 2009 and in 2011. Being in the corrective stage of a measure might improve 
peer pressure on a country to comply with EU-level targets. This could for instance result 
in quite detailed NRPs containing precise policy steps and deadlines for the 
implementation of laws. In both years all four case countries reported to the Lisbon 
Strategy or Europe 2020 ambitions. Of these four countries, only the UK was in the EDP 
procedure at the beginning of 2009, although Poland and Spain entered the EDP in July 
and April 2009 respectively. In 2011, all four countries were in the EDP. Thus, in 2011 
three out of four countries could have experienced more peer pressure to meet budgetary 
rules than in 2009. However, not being part of the Eurozone, the UK and Poland do not run 
the risk of getting fines, which might decrease the countries’ perceived peer pressure. In 
addition, Poland, Spain and Germany signed the Euro Plus Pact and reported on this in 
their NRPs, whereas the UK did not sign this Pact. Lastly, the state of macro-economic 
imbalances has not been assessed within the time frame of the European Semester 2011, 
making it unlikely that this coordination cycle changed the behaviour of countries in 
2011. 
 
Comparing the NRPs of 2009 and 2011, there is more diversity in the goals the four 
countries strive for in 2011 than in 2009. This is related to the introduction of many new 
sets of goals as of 2010, including quantitative targets, the flagship initiatives, the short-
term goals in the Annual Growth Survey and the long-term goals in the employment 
guidelines. The increase in the number of different goals thus seems to have offered 
countries leeway to pick and choose between sets of targets to report on in their NRPs. In 
2009, goals addressed by the four countries predominantly concerned the CSRs, Points to 
Watch (PTW that resemble the characteristics of CSRs as these are developed based on 




economic policies. Germany for instance reported according to the integrated guidelines 
and to the CSRs and PTW, whereas Poland focused solely on the CSRs and PTW. The UK also 
mentions the guidelines, but reports on thematic issues that refer to the EU’s priority 
areas set by the Spring European Council 2008. In addressing the priority areas the UK 
also refers to the CSRs and the PTW it has gotten. It moreover refers to the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) stating that it is committed to it. Spain also used the CSR 
to report on, however, also used broader policy themes, including economic and 
budgetary issues. Spain moreover mentions some quantitative targets, for instance the 
employment rate target. Spain’s NRP not only covers the guidelines and CSRs, but also 
‘key challenges’, Euro area recommendations, and PTW. In 2011, there is somewhat 
greater variety in targets to which the four countries respond. In its NRP of 2011 the UK 
refers to both the employment guidelines and the BPEGs. Poland also refers to some of 
these guidelines, however, more often chooses to relate its policies to the EU’s thematic 
flagship initiatives. The UK, ES, and DE (sometimes briefly) refer to the Annual Growth 
Survey. All four countries address the quantitative headline targets, but none refers to 
CSRs, probably due to the start of the new Europe 2020 strategy. 
 
Interestingly, the UK, DE and ES point at yet another set of goals in 2011: country specific 
bottlenecks adopted by the ECOFIN Council following the need to identify the main 
obstacles for growth and job creation at EU and national level (Council, 2010; European 
Commission, 2010). The bottlenecks integrate macro and micro level growth policies 
regarding on the one hand budgetary, financial, and external imbalances with labour 
utilisation, investment, and productivity, on the other hand. These bottlenecks thus deal 
with a range of policy items with an emphasis on financial and economic issues, which is 
also reflected in the country-specific bottlenecks. The bottlenecks should be reported on 
in NRPs, which three out of four countries consequently did. The UK even structured its 
NRP according to the bottlenecks. Four out of five bottlenecks for the UK regard economy 
and finances, and one addresses the education system and human capital formation. For 
Spain three bottlenecks address economic and financial issues, one addresses the labour 
market and one the education system. Germany received five bottlenecks, two of which 
deal with the underutilisation of labour potential and its education system that 
insufficiently contributes to human capital formation. Poland also mentions ‘bottlenecks 
to growth identified for Poland’, however without a reference to the ECOFIN conclusions 
and without really using it in policy responses. The introduction of these bottlenecks 
brings more financial and economic targets into the policy cycle and moreover widens 
the set of targets for member states. As such it contributes to the leeway countries have 
to pick and choose which targets to meet. 
 
This leeway is also seen in the national responses to the quantitative targets of Europe 
2020. In line with the option given by the EU, member states all set their own 
quantitative goals in 2011, resulting in an overall less ambitious EU 2020. The UK has 
defined only one of the five quantitative targets (see table 2 for part of these targets). 
Regarding the reduction of poverty, national definitions vary considerably, and refer 
sometimes to the reduction of jobless households instead of reducing the number of 
people in or at risk of poverty. Thus, the quantitative targets may be adjusted according to 
a country’s ambition; however, also the definition of a target may be altered, thus also 






Table 2: EU and Member State quantitative targets related to employment and social policies 











Reduction of poverty 
EU headline 
target 75% 10% 40% Minus 20 million people 
Estimated EU 
average goal 73.7 – 74% 10.3-10.5% 37.5-38% Cannot be calculated  
Germany 77% <10% 42% 330,000 (long-term 
unemployed) 
Poland 71% 4.5% 45% 1,500,000 
Spain 74% 15% 44% 1,400,000- 
1,500,000 






Existing targets of 2010 
Child Poverty Act 
Source: European Commission 
 
6.1 Integration of policy fields in NRPs 
In contrast with 2009, the 2011 NRPs show the impact of stricter economic governance in 
the sense that all four NRPs explicitly refer to the SCP for a more detailed outline of 
economic and budgetary measures. It shows some degree of integration of policy fields 
and coordination cycles. Yet, all four NRPs 2011 also show that countries take their own 
route in fulfilling EU level goals. Poland explicitly states that the NRP above all takes into 
account the national situation, and while tackling national growth bottlenecks also 
delivers EU targets. It subsequently connects its own national list of priorities to the EU 
targets and moreover shows leeway in response by referring to BPEGs that are not 
relevant for the Polish case. The NRPs also show that meeting economic and financial 
targets impacts employment and social security, thus showing the integration of policy 
fields. The Polish NRP 2011 mentions that in order to reduce the excessive deficit, it will 
lower its spending on less effective active labour market programmes and that it will 
amend its pension system. The UK puts forward the reform of its welfare system as a way 
to contribute to the fiscal consolidation plans. Germany, conversely, aims at fiscal 
consolidation without obstructing the potential for growth or threatening social balance. 
It plans to introduce more incentives to take up work, to reform the health care insurance 
system, but also to invest in education, research, and innovation. 
 
In the NRPs of 2009, the four countries do not refer very explicitly to the stability or 
convergence programmes (SCP), yet they seem aware of the EU’s fiscal rules. Only the UK 
refers to its upcoming SCP for more information about the country’s financial and 
budgetary policies. Germany does mention some economic and financial policies, those 




attempts to significantly reduce public expenditure, as mentioned in the NRPs of 2011, in 
2009 countries were still pursuing an anti-cyclical investment policy to counter the 
effects of the crisis. They report that investments are in line with the recommendations 
of the Commission and the Council in the EERP. Germany argues that it can make 
investments, because of its good financial situation and economy. Also Poland still 
experiences economic growth and even though it mentions a budget deficit of 3.8% of 
GDP, it explains not to be too hasty with reducing this deficit to avoid the risk of entering 
into a recession. Poland also mentions the SCP, but in relation to the CSR on budget 
discipline and the recommendations of the ECOFIN Council of July 2009, that opened the 
excessive deficit procedures for Poland and gave recommendations on corrective actions 
(Council, 2009b). Whereas Poland and Germany still had a relatively good economy early 
2009, Spain and the UK already witnessed an economic decline early 2009. Using the 
Commission’s EERP Spain argues that it wants to combine short-term investments in 
order to boost demand with longer-term structural reforms. Spain is aware it will exceed 
the 3% criterion, however, it is sure that it will dive below this percentage in 2012, thus 
meeting the EPD and other criteria. Also the UK refers to the EERP to explain its support 
for the economy and for those who need it most, while ensuring sound public finances.  
 
Thus, the integration of financial and economic policy fields is much more visible in 2011 
and the pressure of countries to meet the 3% deficit criteria is sometimes a reason to 
start cutting budgets among others in social policy domains. This is in contrast with the 
year 2009, where the EU still advocated an anti-cyclical investment agenda which 
Germany, the UK and Spain used to support their investments into their economies. 
 
6.2 Concrete policy steps in NRPs 
Also within the NRPs, steps toward more precision may be witnessed, for instance if these 
contain small policy steps or deadlines. Having examined the reports of 2009 and 2011, 
the overall conclusion is that the four countries differ in their way of reporting to the EU 
and that these differences neither show a division between Eurozone and non-Eurozone 
countries nor between countries in different economic situations. Poland for instance is 
not a Eurozone member, yet has quite a detailed NRP in 2011, as will be illustrated in the 
remainder of this section. In addition, the two member states in this study with the best 
performing economies, Germany and Poland, have the most detailed NRPs in 2011. 
Conversely, in spite of a significantly deteriorating economy, Spain’s NRP of 2011 is much 
less detailed than that of 2009. It shows that countries had and still have leeway to choose 
in how much detail they spell out policy steps and give deadlines and that experiencing 
economic decline or being in the Eurozone does not necessarily increase the pressure of 
handing in more in-depth NRPs. If countries whish to, they can remain vague about their 
policy plans. 
 
The content of the German NRP is rather detailed, both the 2009 and the 2011. It gives the 
status of the implementation of projects, its date of entry into force, and some examples 
of measures in the different Länder. Its NRPs also contain detailed descriptions of 
measures, the reasons for introducing the measure, and to which integrated guidelines, 
CSRs and PTW the measures pertain to. Germany also presents its plans in a very detailed 
table. The NRP for instance introduces the scheme “Networks for Effective Assistance for 




improving the linkages between local support structures. It says to have a budget of 25 
million Euros, to run in about 100 locations, and to start in April to June 2011. 
 
The NRP 2009 of Spain includes a huge table full of programmes, containing all the 
measures in the report, to which CSRs these relate, whether or not the plan has been 
approved, what the prospective implementation date is, budgets, references to specific 
Acts where relevant and the role of the different Spanish regions. An impressive amount 
of EU targets is integrated in order to show how Spain is meeting these. Moreover, the 
NRP has sections with updates of certain policy measures or plans and their status. The 
2011 NRP of Spain seems much less developed. It sets some long-term and midterm 
targets, for instance an employment participation rate of 66% in 2015. It also defines 
more detailed labour market obstacles to increase its participation rates and for instance 
mentions a labour market reform in the Act 35/2010 of 17 September 2010, aiming to 
reduce labour market segmentation, to enhance employer’s internal flexibility and to 
improve the employment opportunities for unemployed who have greater difficulties 
with finding employment. Yet, in 2011 Spain especially reports on already implemented 
programmes that will keep running the next few years and it hardly includes deadlines 
for further policy implementation. Sometimes it says to do something with a certain 
speed, e.g. regarding the Euro Plus commitment to reform collective bargaining it 
mentions new initiatives being expressed `shortly`. Such expression is less precise than a 
deadline with a specific date. 
 
The Polish NRP of 2009 is not that detailed as the one in 2011, although it does provide 
some information on implementation date. Regarding unemployment benefits, Poland 
mentions that it amended the Promotion of Employment and Labour Market Institutions 
Act, meaning among others that from January 1st 2010 onwards, the amount of benefit 
received will be 20% higher, while reducing unemployment benefit after 3 months. Its 
aim is to raise the level of social protection while motivating the unemployed to seek for 
new employment. The Polish NRP 2011 is more precise and has for each thematic issue 
quite a detailed list of what actions to take by which Ministry, including a list of specific 
tasks to be done in 2011. For instance, concerning labour market policies, Poland defines 
16 action lines and 14 tasks to be carried out in 2011. Task 3.1.12 is the facilitation of 
reconciling work and care and the development of child care institutions for children 
aged up to 3 years, to be carried out by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. One task 
for this Ministry is the implementation of the Act of 4 February 2011 on care of children 
up to 3 years of age and the start of the “Toddler programme”. Also concerning the 
headline targets of Europe 2020 the Polish NRP is quite precise, including a time table 
with the expected labour participation rates for each year leading up to its 2020 target. 
 
The UK is at times also quite detailed in its NRP, although fails, as table 2 showed to set 
concrete quantitative targets. In 2009, the UK report shows some details for instance 
when it presents its commitment to delivering 35,000 additional apprenticeships in 2009 
and announces the Future Jobs Fund of £1 billion, aiming to support the creation of jobs 
for long-term unemployed young people, and other disadvantaged groups by creating 
150,000 jobs, at least 100,000 of which will be aimed at 18-24 year olds who have been 
out of work for a year. For 2011, the UK has for each bottleneck a list of actions to take, 




instance establish 24 new technical colleges by 2014. The UK moreover includes the plans 
of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. 
 
6.3 Country-Specific Recommendations for member states 
Whereas the level of detail in the NRPs 2009 and 2011 do not show a clear evolution, the 
CSRs have been reshaped quite considerably in the same period. A first observation is 
that all four countries have received much more CSRs in 2008-2009 than in 2011 and that 
these latter CSRs are in several ways more detailed. The number of CSRs for Germany 
grew from two in 2009 to four in 2011, for Poland from four to seven, for the UK from 
two to five and for Spain from three to seven CSRs. This growth in number of CSRs is 
firstly a result of the inclusion of a CSR on budgetary commitments under the EDP and is 
secondly caused by much more detailed policy suggestions, thus breaking up a broad 
policy recommendation into several more concrete recommendations. This makes the 
coordination cycle more precise. In the 2008-2009 CSRs, specific references to the GSP 
are largely absent. Only for Poland and the UK a CSR refers to the status of the public 
finances. For Poland the EU recommends to sustain budgetary discipline and introduce 
additional mechanisms to improve control over expenditure and that Poland should do so 
by reforming the Farmers' Social Security System. The CSRs for Spain do not mention 
public finances at all and only refer to broad problem areas in the labour market and the 
economy. Conversely, in 2011 all four countries have received a first CSR on fiscal 
consolidation or budgetary strategies as agreed upon in the context of the EDP. This first 
CSR was for three countries combined with the message that the consolidation should be 
sustainable and growth-friendly (DE, PL, UK). In 2011, only the UK received a CSR explicitly 
addressing social policy issues and was recommended to reduce the number of workless 
households, focusing on people who are inactive due to caring responsibilities. Plans on 
this should however meet budgetary commitments. 
 
Moreover, the CSRs of 2008-2009 generally contain a few lines, whereas those of 2011 are 
much more pronounced. The latter CSRs therefore often also contain more detailed views 
on how to tackle an issue. To show in more detail what has changed, the Polish CSRs may 
serve as an illustration. In 2009, Poland received the very broad CSR referring to 
employment issues: “develop an integrated ‘flexicurity’ approach, by implementing an active 
ageing strategy, continuing actions to improve active labour market policy, notably for 
disadvantaged groups, reviewing benefit systems to improve incentives to work, and putting in 
place the lifelong learning strategy” (Council, 2009, p. 20). Much of the same items have been 
addressed in the Polish CSRs of 2011, however, now spreading the single recommendation 
over a number of recommendations and being much more explicit about what needs to be 
altered. Recommendation three for Poland reads for instance: “Raise as planned the 
statutory retirement age for uniformed services, continue steps to increase the effective 
retirement age, such as linking it to life expectancy. Establish a timetable to further improve 
the rules for farmers' contributions to the social security fund (KRUS) to better reflect 
individual incomes.” (Council, 2011b, p. 7). Recommendation four continues with references 
to specific programmes that Poland is already developing, suggesting that it should 
implement these. Mentioning specific programmes makes a recommendation much more 
precise. “Implement the proposed lifelong learning strategy, enhance apprenticeships and 
dedicated vocational training and education programmes for older workers and low-skilled 




Knowledge’ programme (‘Budujemy na Wiedzy’). Implement the higher education reform 
programme ‘Partnership for Knowledge’ (‘Partnerstwo dla Wiedzy’) so as to better align 
educational provision with labour market needs.” (Council, 2011b, p. 7). A fifth CSR for Poland 
additionally calls to improve female labour market participation by improving child care 
facilities. 
  
In 2011, deadlines have been given to all four countries. Such deadlines were not part of 
the CSRs of 2008-2009 meaning that CSRs have become more precise. The 2011 deadlines 
have been attached to some individual CSRs, while in general the EU expects that member 
states deal with the recommendations within 12 to 18 months. Especially CSRs related to 
financial and budgetary targets contain deadlines and the Commission refers in this 
respect to the SGP or EDP. For some countries deadlines also pertain to other types of 
CSRs. Spain has received for instance a CSR to assess by the end of 2011 the impact of two 
labour market reforms. The UK should adopt a comprehensive strategy to reduce early 
school-leaving by the end of 2012. Also Poland should by 2013 enact legislation with a 
view to implementing a permanent expenditure rule. Such deadlines and sometimes quite 
detailed CSRs show that soft coordination has become more precise. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper contains a first assessment of the impact of the EU’s stricter economic 
governance on employment and social policy coordination by assessing whether the 
introduction of the  new economic governance has introduced steps on the continuum 
towards hard law, also in soft law coordination cycles. It distinguishes two routes for such 
steps towards hard law, these being the implementation of more binding coordination 
elements and the integration of policy fields. The paper shows that stricter economic 
governance has resulted in some areas in more precision, obligation and delegation. 
Europe 2020 for instance gained additional soft law elements such as deadlines that form 
a step on the continuum towards precision in steering member state policies. Also the 
CSRs have become more precise in suggesting member states which policies to 
implement or alter and CSRs have started containing deadlines. The Euro Plus Pact is a 
new soft law policy cycle also containing deadlines and demanding detailed policy steps. 
In addition, the SGP, which already was a hybrid constellation of soft and hard 
coordination, gained additional hard and soft law elements and introduced more 
obligation, delegation and precision. Also the new macro-economic imbalances 
surveillance is a hybrid constellation of coordination containing quite some precision, 
obligation and delegation. Moreover, policy fields remain to some extent integrated while 
the ambiguity concerning the applicability of coordination methods is not reduced by the 
economic governance package. Such ambiguity is especially visible where it concerns an 
economic reading of social policy goals. Pension schemes and labour costs are for 
instance issues of interest in discussing budgetary and economic problems at EU level. 
 
Comparing the NRPs of four countries in 2009 and 2011, the conclusion is that there is 
still considerable leeway in responses to EU demands, also for Eurozone countries. Due to 
the existence of different sets of goals, countries seem to be able to pick and choose 
between sets of targets and countries still have flexibility in choosing how to meet goals. 
Moreover, the evolution of NRPs is not necessarily an evolution towards more precision, 




explained by the economic situation of a country, nor by its membership of the Eurozone. 
In this respect peer pressure stemming from the economic or budgetary situation is not 
necessarily present in NRPs. While the NRPs have not necessarily become more detailed, 
the CSRs do show a change between 2009 and 2011. They have become more precise, 
contain deadlines and at times make detailed policy suggestions, sometimes referring to 
specific national programmes instead of to broad policy themes. The integration of policy 
fields is visible in the CSRs of 2011 which now contain references to debt and deficit 
rules and commitments of the member states in the EDP. The NRPs also refer to these 
budgetary rules and some countries report to change social policies in order to reduce 
government expenditure, for instance Poland that changes its pension system and the UK 
that revises its welfare policy. 
 
Thus, although more precision, obligation and delegation have been included in the 
different coordination methods, and whereas the coordination practice of the EU in 
setting CSRs has become more precise and encompasses several policy fields, the actual 
country-responses in NRPs show leeway for countries to deal with their employment 
policies. Perhaps more time needs to pass before the new coordination methods influence 
the reporting by member states. However, the actual functioning of the coordination 
process as well as the precise impact on social and employment policies, might also 
depend on the strategies that political and social actors adopt (Pochet, 2010, see also 
discussion in Trubek et al., 2005). Future research therefore might benefit from adding 
future policy cycles to the analysis and/or include the behaviour of national and European 
level actors into the analysis. This paper’s first analysis shows that it is worthwhile to 
keep a close watch on the EU’s economic governance and its influence on employment 
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